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Rules Are Meant to Be Amended
HOW REGULATION CROWDFUNDING’S FINAL
RULES IMPACT THE LIVES OF STARTUPS AND
SMALL BUSINESSES
INTRODUCTION
Before 2012, U.S. retail investors had very little access to
the most exciting investment opportunities. Today, the
American people—not just the wealthy—are able to invest in the
potential of thousands of startups that may just be the next big
thing. These are changes that have flowed from the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).1 As President Barack
Obama stated at the bill’s signing:
This bill is a potential game changer . . . [b]ecause of this bill, start-
ups and small businesses will now have access to a big, new pool of
potential investors—namely, the American people. For the first time,
ordinary Americans will be able to go online and invest in the
entrepreneurs that they believe in.2
In response to the difficulties of accessing traditional
methods of funding, entrepreneurs revolutionized the approach to
capital financing.3 Traditional financing, such as bank loans,
venture capital investing, or investments based on retained
earnings are not as easily accessible to small businesses.4 But with
the inception of crowdfunding on platforms like Kickstarter,5
1 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
2 Thomas Kalil & Doug Rand, The Promise of Crowdfunding and American
Innovation, WHITEHOUSEBLOG (June 8, 2016, 9:49 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2016/06/08/promise-crowdfunding-and-american-innovation [https://perma.cc/
ZD5Y-5FYN] (quoting President Barack Obama at JOBS Act Bill Signing).
3 See generally C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012).
4 Bradford, supra note 3, at 5; Kickstarter vs. Equity Crowdfunding,
SEEDINVEST (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/crowdfunding/this-is-not-
kickstarter [https://perma.cc/AZ3K-4PGS].
5 KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com [https://perma.cc/C3VZ-2GSC].
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startups and small businesses have increasingly used innovative
practices to raise capital.6
Crowdfunding is a form of capital financing that uses the
Internet to raise capital through small investments from a large
group of people—the “crowd.”7 There are several distinctive types
of crowdfunding, including: rewards-based, donation-based, and
equity-based crowdfunding.8 In the rewards- and donation-based
models, entrepreneurs propose business ventures to the general
public predominantly through Web-based services such as
Kickstarter9 and IndieGoGo, with the opportunity for donors to get
free a T-shirt or movie credit, for example, as a reward for their
contribution.10 The equity crowdfunding model is different and
presents an issue of applying federal securities laws because it
constitutes the offer and sale of a security.11 Companies that might
otherwise struggle to attract wealthy individuals and institutional
investors, however, now have an alternative avenue to finance
their venture via retail investors and web-based platforms.
6 See Bradford, supra note 3, at 5; Kickstarter vs. Equity Crowdfunding,
supra note 4.
7 See Bradford, supra note 3, at 1; Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or
Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why The Specially Tailored
Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1736
(2012); Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—the SEC Is Riding Off in Two Directions
at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 820 (2016) (“Crowdfunding uses the Internet to raise capital
for a wide range of projects, typically seeking small contributions from a large number
of individuals.”).
8 Anthony Zeoli, The 4 Types of Crowdfunding, CROWDFUNDING LEGAL HUB
(Apr. 27, 2014), https://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2014/04/27/test-3 [https://perma.cc/
6UP9-NYNT].
9 KICKSTARTER, supra note 5.
10 INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/ [https://perma.cc/GPK9-B72P].
11 Under Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a security is defined as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a),15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). Rules for Crowdfunding Regulation,
Securities Act Release No. 9974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (adopting rules to implement Title
III of the JOBS Act) [hereinafter Crowdfunding]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (2012)
(definition of offers and sales of securities).
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To address the issue of equity-based crowdfunding,
Congress passed the JOBS Act in 2012 to establish a regulatory
structure for startups and small businesses to raise capital
through securities offerings using Internet crowdfunding.12 The
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) drafted
Title III and Title IV to provide early-stage businesses the option
to offer and sell securities without overly expensive transaction
costs, thereby easing their means to raise capital.13 Title III,
commonly known as Regulation CF (Reg CF) exempts certain
crowdfunding activities.14 Title IV, commonly known as
Regulation A+ (Reg A+), exempts certain offerings done via
public solicitation for early stage companies as an alternative to
an initial public offering (IPO).15 Specifically, the exemptions
relieve small businesses and emerging growth companies from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),
and the Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) when engaging in
capital raising activities.16 Therefore, companies seeking to avail
12 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306,
§ 302 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2012)) (adding a crowdfunding
exemption to Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933); see Sherief Morsy, The JOBS Act
and Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2014) (“The JOBS Act exempts crowdfunding issuers and
investors from SEC reporting requirements so long as the transactions fall within
statutory boundaries.”). The JOBS Act was enacted to increase American job creation
and economic growth. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 101 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a)) (adding definition of “Emerging Growth Company” to
Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 3(a) to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); see also Kalil & Rand, supra note 2.
13 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act tit. III, IV; Crowdfunding, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 71,388.
14 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act tit. III, IV; see Regulation
Crowdfunding Rules, SEEDINVEST (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/
crowdfunding/regulation-crowdfunding-rules [https://perma.cc/B6MH-B338]. On May
16, 2016, the Commission adopted the final rules of Reg CF, causing polarizing reactions
from issuers, intermediaries, and investors, fearing the unpredictable future of equity
crowdfunding. See Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for
Issuers, SEC (May 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-
051316.htm [https://perma.cc/EB5G-FMQB]. The final rules address issues of protecting
investors from risk of fraudulent activity. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,400.
15 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act tit. IV; see Regulation A+ (Reg A+),
NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation-a [https://perma.cc/YF7M-FYMR] (“Regulation
A+ (Reg A+) is an alternative to a traditional IPO . . . . Through Reg A+ a . . . company
is afforded the opportunity to[ ] [r]aise up to $50 million in a 12 month period using a
‘public solicitation’ of its shares.”).
16 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 101–04, 302; (crowdfunding
exemption from registration requirements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77l (requiring securities to be registered prior to being offered on an exchange);
Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (requiring securities to be registered prior to any
capital raising activity); see Roberta S. Karmel, Crowdfunding: Narrative and Financial
Disclosures, N.Y. L.J. (Online) (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202745015252/Crowdfunding-Narrative-and-Financial-Disclosures [https://perma.cc/
AG9X-MSWW]. Prior to the JOBS Act, businesses would have to rely on other exemptions
from registration, such as Rule 506. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017); see Fast Answers: Rule
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themselves of the JOBS Act must contemplate which equity-
based financing strategy would be more effective for their
business: Reg CF or Reg A+.
This note focuses on comparing the Reg CF and Reg A+
financing schemes by analyzing their costs and relative benefits,
submitting that the Commission has harshly burdened issuers
from adequately raising capital under Reg CF because of its
draconian restrictions on investment and strict investment
limitations. Given its current state, Reg A+’s offering scheme
more likely increases investors’ potential gains while mitigating
the risk of fraudulent issuers. The note ultimately prescribes a
suggested adjustment to the final rules of Reg CF to improve the
capital raising model without eliminating the basic framework
of the exemption. Specifically, to protect investors while
implementing an efficient method for capital raising, the
Commission must alter the final rules of Reg CF, increase the
investment cap, and reevaluate the disclosure requirements to
further promote emerging business development.
I. ANOVERVIEW OF EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A WORLD
FULL OF EAGER INVESTORS
Fundamentally, equity crowdfunding is done via a
combination of crowdsourcing and microfinancing.17 Professor C.
Steven Bradford defines crowdfunding as “funding from the
crowd—raising small amounts of money from a large number of
investors.”18 Entrepreneurs and small businesses seek out
individual investors from the general public, or “the crowd,” to
obtain initial capital and create an opportunity for growth.19
Through Internet platforms like WeFunder, entrepreneurs
connect with a multitude of prospective investors to hopefully
inspire them and give them the availability to invest in a
business at a company’s inception.20
506 of Regulation D, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html
[https://perma.cc/LZV5-HHKT] (allowing a company to “sell its securities to an unlimited
number of ‘accredited investors’ and up to [thirty-five] purchasers,” as long as they
refrain from general solicitations or advertisements). The definition of what is
technically a security has been construed widely, and therefore when not relying on an
explicit exemption, companies can easily run afoul of the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1) (definition of security); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946) (seminal case regarding the definition of an “investment contract” as a
security, finding that investments in orange groves were securities, and should have
therefore been registered).
17 See Bradford, supra note 3, at 10.
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id.
20 Id.; Kickstarter vs. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 4.
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Since Congress enacted the JOBS Act, equity-based
crowdfunding has become an attractive method of capital raising
for startup companies because of the limited starting capital
needed. In 2017, the global amount raised from equity
crowdfunding offerings was $2.5 billion.21 Under an equity-based
crowdfunding model, “individual investors receive some sort of
financial return in exchange for their monetary contributions.”22
Equity crowdfunding offers startups access to all investors23 by
combining “virtual technologies with traditional investing
principles.”24 Crowdfunding “reopen[s] American capital markets
to emerging growth companies,”25 by providing an efficient
financing method to reach the necessary capital, and while
allowing businesses to raise capital without undergoing the costly
process of an IPO.26 Equity crowdfunding neither requires
collateral to receive funds, nor does it increase an issuer’s chances
of experiencing bankruptcy, because there are no initial debts.27
Instead, “payback is ongoing as a share of future revenues.”28
The JOBS Act opens necessary capital markets for
businesses that would otherwise have limited avenues to finance
their companies, if any at all. Specifically, Title III gives startups
21 SeeCrowdfundingStatistics [Updated for 2017], FUNDLY, https://blog.fundly.com/
crowdfunding-statistics [https://perma.cc/N3PG-N57A]; see also Jason Best & Sherwood
Neiss,The 2017State of RegulationCrowdfunding: USSecurities-basedCrowdfunding under
Title III of the JOBS Act, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://
www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/01/127112-2017-state-regulation-crowdfunding-us-
securities-based-crowdfunding-title-iii-jobs-act [https://perma.cc/AHX8-SKTC] (In 2017, the
total proceeds from all Reg CF offerings was $76.8 million.).
22 David Groshoff et al., Crowdfunding 6.0: Does the SEC’s Fintech Law
Failure Reveal the Agency’s True Mission to Protect Solely Accredited Investors?, 9 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 277, 283 (2015).
23 An “unaccredited investor” is an investor who is not qualified as an
accredited investor, failing to meet the income or net worth requirements set out by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. An accredited investor is any person who meets
the requirements stipulated in Regulation D. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017). In the
crowdfunding sense, an unaccredited investor is someone whose individual net worth or
joint net worth with their spouse does not exceed $1,000,000. Id.
24 Michael Vignone, Inside Equity-Based Crowdfunding: Online Financing
Alternatives for Small Businesses, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 804 (2016).
25 Max E. Isaacson, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: Why
Title III of the JOBS Act Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20 N.C. BANKING
INST. 439, 445 (2016) (quoting Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–
106, § 2, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)).
26 See generally Considering an IPO to Fuel Your Company’s Future?: Insight Into
the Costs of Going Public and Being Public, PWC (Nov. 2017), https://www.pwc.com/
us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y52E-JRUH] [hereinafter
PWC] (summarizing the costs of an IPO).
27 See RYAN TAYLOR, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOC., ISSUE BREIF NO. 5,
EQUITY-BASEDCROWDFUNDING: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FORSMALLBUSINESSCAPITAL
3 (2015), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/Issue-Brief-5-Equity-Based-
Crowdfunding_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7RS-RZNK].
28 Id. This is an equity-based financing model. No debt is included to eliminate
companies from turning to bankruptcy as a way out. Id.
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and entrepreneurs a cost-efficient exemption to registration that
“may increase both capital formation and the efficiency of capital
allocation among small issuers by expanding the range of methods
of external financing available to small businesses and the pool of
investorswilling to finance such types of businesses.”29 Title III was
designed to alleviate expenses for startups and small businesses,
promote crowdfunding investments, and “increase[ ] economic
growth and job creation.”30
Title III is the crowdfunding exemption to the registration
requirements associated with an IPO, otherwise mandated by
Section 5 of the Securities Act.31 Under the Securities Act, the offer
or sale of any security must be registered with the Commission
pursuant to Section 5, unless qualifying for an exemption.32 Title
III added Section 4(a)(6), which exempts crowdfunding
transactions from registration.33 Section 4(a)(6) allows issuers to
raise a maximum of $1.07 million, and avoid the registration
requirements under Section 5.34 The aggregate amount sold to an
investor during a twelvemonth period cannot exceed the greater of
$2,200 or five percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual income
or net worth if either is less than $107,000.35
Congress designated Title III and Title IV of the JOBS
Act to facilitate small business growth by expanding registration
29 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,492 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 227). See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act tit. III (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). In 2015, equity crowdfunding accounted for roughly $2.5 billion
in online capital raising. Crowdfunding Industry Statistics 2015 2016, CROWD EXPERT,
http://crowdexpert.com/crowdfunding-industry-statistics [https://perma.cc/ZN2L-N86A].
30 Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, JOBS Act Eases Regulatory Burdens on Capital
Raising, NAT’L L. REV (Apr. 18. 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/jobs-act-
eases-regulatory-burdens-capital-raising [https://perma.cc/QKW7-MB34].
31 See generally Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (including
the definition of a security). Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)) (crowdfunding exemption); Securities Act of 1933
§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (registration requirement).
32 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
33 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)) (“The provisions of [Section 5] of this title shall not apply
to . . . transactions involving the offer or sale of securities by an issuer . . . provided that
the aggregate amount sold to all investors by the issuer, including any amount sold in
reliance on the exemption provided under this paragraph during the [twelve-]month
period preceding the date of such transaction, is not more than $1,000,000.”).
34 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2017) (“The aggregate amount of securities sold to
all investors by the issuer in reliance on section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C.
77d(a)(6)) during the 12-month period preceding the date of such offer or sale, including
the securities offered in such transaction, shall not exceed $1,000,000 . . . .”).
35 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2017) (If the investor’s annual income and net
worth are equal or more than $107,000, the aggregate amount sold to that investor
during the twelve-month period shall not exceed ten percent of the lessor of the investor’s
annual income or net worth, not to exceed an amount sold of $107,000).
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exemptions.36 Title IV contains a mandate to the Commission to
expand Regulation A to promote “small company capital
formation.”37 Nevertheless, these new regulations pose serious
concerns for businesses and their intermediaries. Notably, the
final rules of Title III allow any investor, accredited or
unaccredited, “to purchase unregistered securities from issuers
utilizing . . . funding portals.”38 Intermediaries are the Internet-
based platforms commonly referred to as funding portals39 and
brokers,40 which under Reg CF must register with the
Commission prior to eligibility.41 They must also become a
member of a registered national securities association, such as
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).42 Funding
portals match interested investors with available crowdfunding
ventures, and hold investor funds until the specified target
offering amount is reached.43 Intermediaries lament that Reg CF
36 Isaacson, supra note 25, at 441.
37 Id. at 447 (quoting Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)).
38 Id. at 453.
39 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (funding portals are defined as any “person”
involved in transactions for the offer and sale of securities on behalf of the account of another).
40 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(c) (2017); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,428
(Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (“The term ‘broker’ is generally defined
in the Exchange Act Section 3(a)(4) as any person that effects transactions in securities
for the account of others. Exchange Act Section 3(a)(80) defines the term ‘funding portal’
as any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of
securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to Securities Act Section 4(a)(6), that
does not: (1) Offer investment advice or recommendations; (2) solicit purchases, sales or
others to buy the securities offering or displayed on its Web site or portal; (3) compensate
employees, agents or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities
displayed or referenced on its Web site or portal; (4) hold, manage, possess or otherwise
handle investor funds or securities; or (5) engage in such other activities as the
Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.”).
41 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (2017) (“The transaction [must be] conducted
through an intermediary that complies with the requirements in Section 4A(a) of the
Securities Act . . . and the related requirements in this part, and the transaction is
conducted exclusively through the intermediary’s platform . . . .”); id. § 227.300
(requiring intermediaries to be registered); Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New
Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the Crowdfund Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 177, 180 (2013).
42 17 C.F.R. § 227.300 (2017); see JD Alois, There are Now 14 FINRA Approved
Funding Portals Created by Title III of the JOBS Act, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2016,
8:47 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/08/88857-now-14-finra-approved-
funding-portals-created-title-iii-jobs-act [https://perma.cc/T6SN-TA7M]; What We Do,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/T2U7-59YZ]; Funding
Portals We Regulate, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate
[https://perma.cc/XRF7-UBD2].
43 See Heminway, supra note 41, at 180–82. Alois, supra note 42 (“14 funding
portals . . . have been approved to offer securities under Title III of the JOBS Act.”); JD
Alois, There are Now 17 Registered Reg CF Platforms. Can they be Sustained?,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2016, 10:52 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2016/10/91212-now-17-registered-reg-cf-platforms-can-sustained/ [https://perma.cc/
62BS-38BW] (“In reviewing the overall data as provided by WeFunder, there have been
40 successful offering raising about $9.4 million as of this week.”).
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charges them with mandatory reporting requirements,44 and
requires them to bear the burden of identifying an “issuer or the
offering [that] presents the potential for fraud or otherwise
raises concerns about investor protection.”45 The requirement to
thoroughly review each issuer places a cumbersome burden on
intermediaries and consequently provides insufficient protection
for investors.46
The maximum raise under Reg CF has caused startup
entrepreneurs to seriously weigh its advantages against those of
Reg A+. The maximum offering in a twelve-month period is
$1.07 million—an insufficient amount to launch a successful
offering.47 Meanwhile, the maximum offering under Title IV Reg
A+ rules is either $20 million (Tier 1) or $50 million (Tier 2).48
The drawback to Reg A+ is the significant time and expenses to
make a Reg A+ offering.49 Therefore, issuers need a thorough
understanding of both regulatory schemes before pursuing
either financing strategy. Former Chair of the CommissionMary
Jo White has said,
[t]here is a great deal of enthusiasm in the marketplace for
crowdfunding, and I believe these rules and proposed amendments
provide smaller companies with innovative ways to raise capital and
give investors the protections they need . . . [w]ith these rules, the
Commission has completed all of the major rulemaking mandated
under the JOBS Act.50
Now that Regulation Crowdfunding has officially been
active51 for over two years, funding portals are beginning to react
to its effects, and small market issuers have two separate
financing methods to consider.
44 See Heminway, supra note 41, at 205.
45 17 C.F.R. § 227.301(c)(2) (2017). Robert Robbins & Amy Modzelesky, Can
Regulation A+ Succeed Where Regulation A Failed?, AM. L. INST. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., 1–10 (May 6, 2015).
46 Id. at 7.
47 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2017). See Crowdsourcing a Title III Equity
Crowdfunding Cost Model, SEEDINVEST (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.seedinvest.com/
blog/jobs-act/crowdsourcing-title-iii-crowdfunding-cost-model [https://perma.cc/64DG-
J3V6] (“A successful $1M raise will actually only net $750,000 in capital. This is an
astronomical cost of capital.”).
48 17C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1)-(2) (2017); seeRobbins&Modzelesky, supranote 45, at 7.
49 Id. at 7.
50 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html
[https://perma.cc/Q84X-JZDR].
51 See Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 45, at 1.
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II. REGULATION A+: THE “MINI IPO” AND THE BENEFITS OF
A TWO-TIER SYSTEM
Effective as of June 19, 2015, “the SEC adopted
amendments to Regulation A and other rules to implement
Section 401 of the JOBS Act and provide an exemption from
registration for offerings up to $50 million.”52 An expansion of
Reg A, Reg A+ is a two-tier offering model exempt from Section
5 registration requirements of the Securities Act under Section
3(b).53 Since Reg A+ was introduced to small businesses, it has
been considered successful.54
Prior to the final rules, Reg A provided private companies an
exemption from registration for up to $5 million.55 Reg A required a
revamp because many entrepreneurs and investors saw the
financing scheme as futile given the relative costs in comparison to
that of a traditional IPO.56 Reg A+ raised this offering exemption to
a $50million ceiling.57 During implementation, Mike Norman, CEO
of the top funding portalWeFunder, called Reg A+ a “great first step
to allow everyone to invest in the startups that inspire them.”58
RegA+ is often referred to as “mini-IPO” because aside from
its $50 million investment limit and the less burdensome fees and
ongoing reporting requirements, it functions near identical to an
IPO.59 Under Reg A+, companiesmust seek both state qualification
and SEC review and approval.60 Naturally, filing costs and
compliance fees are lower than they would be under a traditional
52 Karmel, supra note 16, at 1.
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2017).
54 SeeRobinSosnow,RegA+:ASuccessfulFirstYearDespiteRegulatoryAmbiguities,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/03/
83688-reg-a-a-successful-first-year-despite-regulatory-ambiguities [https://perma.cc/85TC-
EBVT]. JD Alois, The SEC Has Qualified 48 Reg A+ Offers for About $840 Million,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 19, 2016, 12:16 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/
07/88126-sec-qualified-48-reg-offers-840-million [https://perma.cc/6L6X-7DJW].
55 See Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 45, at 1.
56 See JD Alois, Deck: Marketplace Lending Using Reg A+, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(Apr. 8, 2016, 8:31AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/04/84388-marketplace-lending-
using-reg-a [https://perma.cc/G799-6WLG] (see slide seven, indicating that launching an
IPO, or finding financing through a Rule 506 Regulation D platform would cost the
essentially the same as an offering under old Regulation A).
57 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2017).
58 JD Alois, Regulation A+: What Do Industry Leaders Think About the New
Investment Crowdfunding Exemption, CROWDFUND INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 5:27 PM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/06/69823-regulation-a-what-do-industry-leaders-
think-about-the-new-investment-crowdfunding-exemption [https://perma.cc/77UY-FDE4].
59 Raising Capital using a Regulation A+ Mini-IPO, SEEDINVEST, https://
www.seedinvest.com/blog/raising-capital/raising-capital-reg-a-mini-ipo [https://perma.cc/
6YNN-KFAE].
60 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d) (2017). Raising Capital using a Regulation A+ Mini-
IPO, supra note 59.
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IPO,61 but under the exemption, companies must file a Form 1-A to
minimize risk and eliminate fraudulent activity.62
Reg A+ allows for two kinds of offerings, Tier 1 and Tier
2.63 Tier 1 offerings have a capital limitation of $20 million
during any twelve-month period, including no more than $6
million offered by selling security holders that are affiliates of
the issuer.64 Under Tier 1, a company’s financials are not subject
to ongoing reporting or auditing costs, yet issuers are subject to
state securities laws.65 Further, for both a Tier 1 and Tier 2, the
Commission restricts secondary sales by the issuer’s affiliates,
limiting security holders to “no more than 30 percent of a
particular offering in the issuer’s initial Regulation A offering
and subsequent Regulation A offerings for the first twelve
months following the initial offering.”66
Under Tier 2, there is no minimum capital requirement,
but the amount of investment during a twelve-month period
cannot exceed $50 million67 including no more than “$15
[million] offered by all selling security holders that are affiliates
of the issuer.”68 Tier 2 offerings are preempted from state review
and exempt from Blue Sky laws,69 thereby saving issuers from
61 Id. See PWC, supra note 26, at 20. Compliance costs and filing fees are higher
under Reg A+ than under Reg CF.
62 17C.F.R. §§ 230.252(a)-(d), 230.253(a) (2017). Robbins&Modzelesky, supranote
45, at 4 (“Issuers are required to file an offering statement on Form 1-A, consisting of three
parts: Part 1 (Notification), Part II (Offering Circular) and Part III (Exhibits). . . . Both Tier 1
and Tier 2 issuers are required to file balance sheets and other required financial statements
as of the two most recent fiscal year ends (or such shorter time as such issuer has been in
existence).”). Reg A+’s disclosure form, Form 1-A, is an extensive disclosure document
that includes “business, legal and financial information about the company and is subject
to review and comments by the SEC.” Lior Ostashinsky, Raising Funds Online via
Crowdfunding from the General Public: Regulation A+ vs. Regulation Crowdfunding,
Crowdfund Insider (Jan. 8, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/01/
94477-raising-funds-online-via-crowdfunding-from-the-general-public-regulation-a-vs-regulatio
n-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/7SVW-95PE].
63 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2017).
64 Id. § 230.251(a)(1) Tier 1 allows companies to offer up to $20 million of their
securities in any twelve-month period and secondary sales by affiliates may constitute
up to 30% of the first round of offerings and up to $6 million in subsequent years. Id.; see
Bonnie J. Roe, Will Regulation A+ Find its Niche? Some Opportunities to Explore, BUS.
L. TODAY 1, 2 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/20
15/12/full-issue-201512.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GVV-4JQR].
65 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(a) (2015). Still, Tier 1 offerings must disclose
reviewed financials and comply with Blue Sky Laws. Alois, supra note 56 (see slides 8
and 9 of the presentation).
66 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
49.html [https://perma.cc/4B59-4WH8]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(3) (2015).
67 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015).
68 Id.
69 SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, supra
note 66. Blue sky laws are state securities laws that are “designed to protect investors
against fraudulent sales practices and activities.” Fast Answers: Blue Sky Laws, SEC. &
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exorbitant reporting costs.70 Nevertheless, Tier 2 offerings are
required to submit audited financials and ongoing disclosures to
crowdfunding websites, potential investors, current investors,
and the Commission. Audited financial statements alone can
cost up to $75,000 for small businesses.71
One of the improvements of Reg A+ is the ability of
businesses to “test the waters,”72 by soliciting potential
investors without offering securities.73 By “gaug[ing] investor
interest,” a company is better positioned to make a more
educated cost-benefit analysis.74 Testing the waters allows
issuers to measure potential investor demand, and the
solicitation allows potential investors time to review an offer.75
The opportunity to test the waters is absent from Reg CF,
creating an additional obstacle for Reg CF issuers.76 The ability
EXCH. COMM’N (last updated Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-
blueskyhtm.html [https://perma.cc/QW2J-8JTM].
70 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015); See Raising Capital using a Regulation A+ Mini-
IPO, supra note 59.
71 Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the
Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21806, 21,881 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260) (SEC states that it cannot provide an
accurate and quantitative estimate but cited a ranged estimate that registered IPOs
below $50 million in 2014 incurred auditing costs from $5,000 to $75,000, or about 1.65%
gross in accounting fees). “The initial qualification and reporting costs for a Tier 2
offering is an estimated $400,000 in the first year and $200,000 annually . . . [t]hus,
Regulation A+ requires far more disclosure requirements and costs than intrastate or
accredited crowdfunding.” Vignone, supra note 24, at 824 (“Audited financials can range
from $5,000 to $75,000 for small businesses and nearly double the cost for reviewed
financials.”).
72 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2015); Michael Raneri, Testing the Waters and Filing a
Regulation A+ Offering with the SEC, FORBES (May 26, 2015, 5:52 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/mraneri/2015/05/26/testing-the-waters-and-filing-a-regulation-a-
offering-with-the-sec/#b05db479dec8 [https://perma.cc/UBZ4-G2XX] (“Rule 255 of the
new Reg A+, ‘Solicitations of interest and other communications,’ specifically allows
companies to promote a potential offering and see how much interest they
receive . . . Issuers can use public channels like social media or email to let investors
know they’re considering offering securities . . . .”); Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’nr, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Grading the Commissions Record on Capital Formation: A+, D, or
Incomplete?, Address at Vanderbilt Law School’s 17th Annual Law and Business
Conference (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/032715-spch-cdmg.html#_
edn17 [https://perma.cc/YYD9-WWHQ].
73 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (2015) (“At any time before the qualification of an
offering statement, including before the non-public submission or public filing of such
offering statement, an issuer or any person authorized to act on behalf of an issuer may
communicate orally or in writing to determine whether there is any interest in
a . . . securities offering.”).
74 See JD Alois, Testing the Waters is ALL About Transparency, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (June 13, 2016, 6:51 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/06/86824-
testing-the-waters-is-all-about-transparency [https://perma.cc/P876-MW8R].
75 See Alois, supra note 74.
76 Id; see also 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (2017) (indicating the Reg CF advertising
restrictions and the lack of a testing the waters provision).
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to measure prospective investor demand distinguishes Reg A+
as an effective financing method.77
Prior to Reg A+ offerings, companies opted for other
capital raising options because the $5 million capital investment
limit was too stringent for startups looking for long-term
expansion.78 The Reg A+ exemption provides these companies
with access to enough capital when an IPO is not a viable option.
The companies that are most successful under a Reg A+
financing scheme are those that have: (1) already raised
significant capital, (2) impressive annual revenue/pre-sales, and
(3) a robust customer base.79 Despite the obstacles, there are
many reasons why a company would opt for Reg A+. For
example, DSTLD, a designer clothing company, underwent a
Reg A+ offering and generated over $17 million in potential
investment demand during its “testing the waters” campaign in
late 2015.80 The CEO of DSTLD noted that a big social network,
a somewhat established but growing client-base, and a solid
business plan to present to the Commission and intermediaries
helps generate interest from potential investors.81
Given the extensive reporting and auditing costs for a
company struggling to reach a $50 million cap, this regulation is
most suitable for established companies, rather than startups with
inadequate capital. While it can prove to be cost efficient, the
disclosure requirements and ongoing reporting under Tier 2 (which
most companies have aimed to finance under) force issuers to have
a sufficient infrastructure already in place.82 Reg A+, however,
gives emerging growth companies the economically feasible
opportunity to raise capital with the possibility of expansion; the
“mini IPO.” In contrast, companies are financed under RegCFwith
the hope of being acquired by some larger company in the future
77 See id.
78 Reg D is a more traditional exemption for the sale of securities, and can
allow issuers to raise an unlimited amount of funds through sale of securities. However,
for the purposes of this note it will focus on Reg A+ and Reg CF. See Ryan Gunn, The
Difference Between Regulation A and Other Capital Raise Options, WEALTHFORGE (Oct.
10, 2017), https://www.wealthforge.com/insights/the-difference-between-regulation-a-
and-other-capital-raise-options [https://perma.cc/F8WS-5VCX].
79 AmyWan &DarrenMarble, Is Reg A+ Crowdfunding Right for Your Business?,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/08/
89185-reg-crowdfunding-right-business [https://perma.cc/R6U3-PT2J].
80 Anthony Zeoli, Why DSTLD is a Perfect Fit for Reg A+: Key Elements to




82 Rod Turner,Guide to Regulation A+ Funding, Manhattan Street Capital (Feb. 26,
2016), http://www.manhattanstreetcapital.com/regulation-a-guide-for-investors-and-startups
[https://perma.cc/QVY5-BR8S].
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because of the limited amount of startup capital, posing a stark
difference between the two financing platforms.
III. REGULATION CROWDFUNDING: WHY THE FINAL RULES
FAIL TO BENEFIT STARTUPS AND SMALL BUSINESSES
On May 16, 2015, the Commission activated the final
rules to Title III and effectuated the Section 4(a)(6) federal
exemption, permitting startups and small businesses to acquire
capital through crowdfunding efforts.83 Sophisticated investors
and funding portals have both intensely scrutinized84 and
applauded85 Reg CF because of its opportunistic future and
destructive costs, respectively. Because of the anonymity of the
Internet and the low success rate of startups and small
businesses,86 Reg CF is inherently risky.87 Thus, it is the
Commission’s objective to protect investors. Nevertheless, Reg
CF is meant to promote emerging business development, given
the limited capital raising alternatives, such as family and
friends, angel investors, commercial loans, peer-to-peer loans,
and micro financing.88 Therefore, entrepreneurs may opt for Reg
CF since other mediums of capital financing would rather look
at companies with higher growth potential and a likelihood of
going public.89
83 SeeCrowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388–90 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227); see also SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding, supra note 50.
84 SeeMarc Snover, Title III CrowdfundingMight Not BeWhatMany Expected,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016, 10:51 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2016/10/91447-title-iii-crowdfunding-might-not-many-expected [https://perma.cc/5JC6-SZFJ];
see also JD Alois, WeFunder Plans to Triple Crowdfunding Growth in 2017, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:43 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/01/94956-wefunder-
plans-triple-crowdfunding-growth-2017 [https://perma.cc/SUF2-SJT6].
85 Since February 22, 2018, WeFunder reported that investors funded over $55
million in Reg CF offerings with “184 successful offerings over $50 [thousand].” The
Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER (Feb. 2, 2018, 2:56 PM),
https://wefunder.com/stats [https://perma.cc/5RVD-PASV]. See JD Alois, Reg CF: 200%
Growth Year over Year, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://
www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/01/126911-reg-cf-200-growth-year-year [https://perma.cc/
B7FV-EGD5] (indicating the amount of investments made in Reg CF offerings grew
roughly 200% since last year, with most offerings made in the tech industry).
86 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,482–88.
87 Id. at 71,391.
88 Id. at 71,482–87.
89 See id. at 71,487 (“A defining feature of VCs is that they tend to focus on
startup companies with high-growth potential and a high likelihood of going public after
a few years of financing. VCs also tend to invest in companies that have already used
some other sources of financing, tend to be concentrated in certain geographic
regions . . . and often require their investments to have an attractive business plan, meet
certain growth benchmarks or fill a specific portfolio or industry niche.”).
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A. Limits on Capital Raise: The $1.07 Million Cap and Its
Limited Glory
The most significant criticism, of which the Commission
is aware, is the restrictive investment cap: $1.07 million over a
twelve-month period.90 The mandated $1.07 million limit on the
aggregate amount sold to all investors over the twelve-month
period curbs the total capital issuers’ can raise under Reg CF.91
Some issuers and intermediaries believe Reg CF is unworkable
because the cap is insufficient, considering the intermediary
fees, transfer agents, and accounting fees that cut against it.92
The Commission remains firm on these rules, indicating that
increasing the limits of capital raising via equity crowdfunding
would undermine its mission to protect investors from fraud.93
The Commission lacks quantifiable data to properly evaluate the
“unrealized efficiency or capital formation associated with the
adoption of the $1 million limit instead of the alternative of a
higher limit,”94which evidences the Commission’s lack of necessary
research on successful crowdfunding ventures. Therefore, the $1.07
million cap indirectly suggests issuers combine Reg CF with
alternativemethods of capital raising, which ultimatelymakes Reg
CF challenging and unattractive.
B. Individual Investment Limits: the Weakness of the
Lesser Provision
Reg CF also limits individual investments depending on
annual income or net worth. If an annual income or net worth of
the investor is less than $100,000, the limit that the person can
invest is “[t]he greater of $2,200 or [five] percent of the lesser of
the investor’s annual income or net worth.”95 If the investor’s
annual income and net worth are both $107,000 or more, the
90 Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2017).
91 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,487; see also 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2017).
92 JD Alois, Seedrs CEO Jeff Lynn Calls Title III Crowdfunding “Not Workable in
its Current Form,” CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 16, 2016, 7:42 AM), http://www.crowd
fundinsider.com/2016/05/85627-seedrs-ceo-jeff-lynn-calls-title-iii-crowdfunding-not-work
able-in-its-current-form/?platform=hootsuite [https://perma.cc/43X8-WDGB]. (“[B]usinesses
will only [look] to turn to crowdfunding as a last resort after more efficient capital-raising
methods have failed. . . . [Reg CF] [r]educes the likelihood of businesses succeeding
raising capital.”).
93 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,494 (“The limitation on the amount that
may be raised is expected to benefit investors by reducing the potential loss from dilution
or fraud in the securities-based crowdfunding market.”).
94 Id.; Groshoff et al., supra note 22, at 280.
95 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(i) (2017) (emphasis added).
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limit is “[ten] percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual
income or net worth,” subjected to a $107,000 sales cap.96
The final rules notably changed the restriction on
investment per investor by including the lesser provision to
eliminate ambiguity. For example, if an individual investor has
a $50,000 annual income and $105,000 in net worth, then such
investor would be subject to an investment of $2,500 (five
percent of $50,000).97 The Commission adopted the lesser
provision due to concerns about investors suffering capacious
losses given the indeterminate risk posed by crowdfunding.98
The benefit is any member of the public, provided they have
$2,200, is allowed to invest that cash into a small and potentially
fruitful business. This amended limitation on individualized
investments will also protect unsophisticated and unaccredited
investors from bearing too great a risk.99 The downside, however,
is that as an investor, you must calculate net worth by the
“lesser” provision, which may not only confuse investors but also
deter them from investing.100
The individual aggregate limit on crowdfunding
investments constrains the efficiency of capital formation. The
restriction impedes investors from security diversification and
other incentives to acquire information and securities from
issuers.101 The Commission is improving investor protection, but
at the cost of making securities-based crowdfunding a
potentially impracticable avenue to raise capital.
96 Id. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,389–90.
97 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,394.
98 Id.
99 Id. (“[W]e believe that the investment limits in the final rules appropriately
take into consideration the need to give issuers access to capital while minimizing an
investor’s exposure to risk in a crowdfunding transaction.”); Updated Investor Bulletin:
Crowdfunding for Investors, INVESTOR.GOV (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.investor.gov/
additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-crowdfunding-investors
[https://perma.cc/H8TK-NQH4]. (“Investments in startups and early-stage ventures are
speculative and these enterprises often fail. Unlike an investment in a mature business
where there is a track record of revenue and income, the success of a startup or early-
stage venture often relies on the development of a new product or service that may or
may not find a market.”).
100 Updated Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding for Investors, supra note 99.
101 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,495 (“As securities-based crowdfunding
investments might have inherently high failure rates, investors who do not or cannot
diversify their investments across a number of offerings can face an increased risk of
incurring large losses, relative to their investments, even when they investigate offerings
thoroughly. By comparison, VC firms typically construct highly diversified portfolios
with the understanding that many ventures fail, resulting in a complete loss of some
investments, but with the expectation that those losses will be offset by the large upside
of the relatively fewer investments that succeed.”).
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C. Issuer Requirements: Issuers Need to Spend Money to
Make Money
Reg CF’s issuer requirements are its most persuasive
selling point because the necessary disclosure requirements—
while still burdensome—are less complex and onerous than the
Section 5 registration process for IPOs. To be a valid issuer and
engage in crowdfunding transactions, an issuer must (1) be from
the United States, (2) not be an investment company, (3) have a
business plan, and (4) have filed ongoing annual reports
required by Reg CF.102
Regarding issuer disclosure requirements, issuer costs
are a cogent deterrent from pursuing a Reg CF approach. The
Commission broke down costs associated with various securities
offerings to show that Reg CF is indeed manageable for small
market issuers.103 Themain costs for issuers are: intermediary fees,
the costs of preparing, ensuring compliance with, and filing Form
C, and accounting review or audit of financial statements.104 To
comply with disclosure requirements issuers must file Form C, a
short form that functions as an understandable and easy-to-use
method aimed to reduce the burden of preparing disclosures for
crowdfunding issuers.105
Disclosure requirements under Rule 201 of Reg CF are
less costly than disclosure requirements under Reg D or even
Reg A+. For example, if an entrepreneur elects to use Reg CF to
finance their latest venture, the average cost of a $1 million
crowdfunding offering is $72,800 to $168,500.106 It seems that
the issuer costs will make smaller offerings more expensive,
102 The enumerated list is not exhaustive. For all issuer requirements, see
generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100(b), 227.201, 227.202, 227.203 (2017) (Reg CF set strict
requirements for issuers).
103 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,497-510 (indicating the many potential
costs for issuers).
104 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,497.
105 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201, 227.202, 227.203 (2017) (“(1) The name, legal status,
physical address and Web site of the issuer, (2) the names of directors and officers and
each person holding more than 20 percent of the shares of the issuer; (3) a description of
the business of the issuer and the anticipated business plan of the issuer; (4) a
description of the financial condition of the issuer; (5) a description of the stated purpose
and intended use of the proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer with respect to the
target offering amount; (6) the target offering amount, the deadline to reach the target
offering amount and regular updates about the progress of the issuer in meeting the
target offering amount; (7) the price to the public of the securities or the method for
determining the price; and (8) a description of the ownership and capital structure of the
issuer.”). Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,398 (footnotes omitted).
106 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,497. In addition to the compliance costs,
issuers will incur costs to obtain EDGAR access codes, prepare and file progress updates
on Form C-U, and prepare and file Form C-TR to terminate ongoing reporting. Id. at
71,497, 71,504.
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which will significantly deter issuers from conducting a
crowdfunding offering. The benefit of these disclosure
requirements, however, is that such financial data will inform
investors about the financial condition of the business, the issuer’s
financial relationships, and will provide an overall understanding
of the risk to help investors make a decision.107 Through Rule 201,
Form C, and a keen eye by an intermediary, crowdfunding
endeavors are presented in a transparent format to investors, and
encourage increased usage of the exemption in the future.108
In addition to the disclosure required through Form C
prior to the offering, issuers must also comply with ongoing
reporting requirements and file annual reports with the
Commission.109 Ongoing reporting is consistent with other
regulatory schemes, and the Commission recognizes that in light
of the small amount of capital raised, an annual reporting
obligation is sufficient.110 These reporting obligations are still
overly stringent in terms of the costs associated with preparing
reports, but the benefit to investors outweighs the issuer’s
financial burden in this regard.111
The Commission also prohibits issuers from potentially
increasing the likelihood of investors becoming informed about
the capital raising. An issuer must transact exclusively through
one intermediary platform for an offering112 This way, the
Commission can protect investors from fraud, ensure
transparency between intermediaries and issuers, provide easily
accessible information in one place for investors, and promote
uniform securities distribution.113
107 The financial condition of the business includes audited, GAAP approved,
financial statements, information about total income, taxable income, and a financial
narrative about the business. For more information on financial statement disclosure
requirements. See id. at 71,405.
108 Id. at 71,504.
109 17 C.F.R. § 227.202(a)-(b) (2017) (explaining what terminates continual
ongoing reporting obligations).
110 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,419–22. In addition to compliance with
disclosure forms, issuers must survive Rule 100(b), which excludes certain categories of
issuers from eligibility based on whether they are investment companies, or companies
organized outside of the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(b) (2017).
111 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,500 (“The disclosure requirements also
may improve informational efficiency in the market. . . . [D]isclosure by issuers engaging
in crowdfunding transactions in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) may inform financial markets
more generally about new consumer trends and new products, thus creating externalities
that benefit other types of investors and issuers.”).
112 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (2017); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,396
(“[T]he final rules define ‘platform’ as ‘a program or application accessible via the Internet
or other similar electronic communication medium through which a registered broker or
a registered funding portal acts as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer
or sale of securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C.
77d(a)(6)).’” (emphasis in original)).
113 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,395–96.
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D. Intermediary Requirements: Even the Middle Man is
Restricted
Reg CF impacts the intermediaries—funding portals and
broker-dealers—as much as issuers and investors. The first rule
is that intermediaries must register as a broker or funding
portal to post issuer’s crowdfunding offerings.114 As of this year,
there are numerous FINRA approved funding portals with over
$100 million committed to issues’ Reg CF offerings.115
Intermediaries, such as WeFunder, are responsible for
reviewing information that issuers provide online (i.e.,
background checks), and therefore act as the guardians against
fraudulent activity by issuers for investors.116 Under Rule 301(a),
intermediaries must have a “reasonable basis” for believing an
issuer involved in an equity-crowdfunding transaction complied
with its own disclosure requirements.117 Furthermore,
intermediaries are prohibited from providing services to issuers
in which the intermediary has a financial interest,118 which
protects investors against a potential conflict of interest or
fraudulent misrepresentation.119 Holding intermediaries to this
standard creates a manageable transparency between investors
and issuers.
114 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(a); Michael McGrath, et al., Joining the Crowd: SEC
Adopts Final Crowdfunding Regulations—Part III—Intermediaries, AM. L. INST.
CONTINUINGLEGALEDUC., 261 (2016) (“[t]o register with the SEC, a funding portal must
first complete Form Funding Portal”).
115 JD Alois, FINRA Approved Reg CF Crowdfunding Portals: 38 and Counting,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2018, 6:05 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2018/03/131246-finra-approved-reg-cf-crowdfunding-portals-38-and-counting [https://
perma.cc/6H5E-DPQF].
116 17 C.F.R. § 227.301 (indicating that intermediaries must have a ‘reasonable
basis’ for believing that an issuer seeking to offer and sell securities in reliance on Title
III Reg CF complies with Section 4A(b)).
117 Id. at § 227.301(a) (indicating intermediaries have the responsibility to
assess whether an issuer complied with Section 4A(b) and related requirements).
Intermediaries can also deny access to issuers if it has a ‘reasonable basis’ for believing
the issuer is subject to a disqualification. See id. § 227.301(c).
118 According to 17 C.F.R. Section 227.300(b), (“Any director, officer or partner
of an intermediary, or any person occupying a similar status or performing a similar
function, may not have a financial interest in an issuer that is offering or selling
securities in reliance on section 4(a)(6) . . . through the intermediary’s platform, or
receive financial interest in an issuer as compensation for the services provided to or for
the benefit of the issuer in connection with the offer or sale of such securities.”). Id.
§ 227.300(b). See Patrick Archambault,How the SEC’s Crowdfunding Rules for Funding
Portals Save the Two-Headed Snake: Drawing the Proper Balance Between Integrity and
Cost, 49 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 61 n.87 (2016).
119 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(b) (2017). Intermediaries must take additional measures
to reduce the risk of fraud through issuer compliance, records of securities holders, bad
actor disqualification, and investor protection obligations. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 71,513 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
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The final rules impose a heavy burden on funding portals
and broker-dealers, also called intermediaries, to take measures
to reduce the risk of fraud.120 Intermediaries are in the best
position to monitor fraud, hence the burden the Commission
imposes on them to ensure issuer compliance.121 For example,
intermediaries can deny access to issuers if they have a
“reasonable basis” for believing an issuer or offering presents a
potential for fraud or raises investor protection concerns because
of the failure to comply with accurate recordkeeping.122
Nevertheless, Rule 402 carves out a safe harbor for funding
portals.123 Funding portals can provide issuers advice on how to
structure their offerings and raise capital effectively, but funding
portals cannot advise investors on the issuers’ investments.124
Intermediaries must provide investors with educational materials
and make any information provided by the issuer available to
investors to preventmisrepresentation or fraud.125 Also, to enhance
transparency, an intermediary must establish a channel of
communication so that investors can discuss the offering between
each other and the issuer’s representative.126 Thus, while
intermediaries take great efforts to reduce fraudulent activity, the
Rule 402 safe harbor gives funding portals the means to protect
investors, strengthen the funding portal industry, and therefore,
improve the crowdfunding market.127
120 17 C.F.R. § 227.301 (2017); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,439; Gregory
D. Deschler, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the Proposed Rules Mean for
Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUISU. L.J. 1145, 1155–56 (2014).
121 Deschler, supra note 120, at 1155–56.
122 17 C.F.R. § 227.301(c)(1) (2017); Deschler, supra note 120, at 1155–60.
123 17 C.F.R. § 227.402 (2017). Rule 305(a) prohibits intermediaries from
compensating any person for providing it with the “personally identifiable information”
of any investor. See id. § 227.305. Rule 402(b) is a conditional safe harbor which permits
funding portals to compensate persons for directing issuers or investors to the platformamong
other permitted activities. Id. § 227.402(b). For example, a funding portal can compensate a
third party for referring investors or issuers to the funding portal, so that the funding portal
can gain additional business. This is meant to enhance market efficiency to increase investor
awareness of available offerings while protecting the integrity of the market. See id.
§ 227.402(b)(6); see also Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,517.
124 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (definition of funding portal); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 227.301, 402 (2017); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,514–17.
125 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,511.
126 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(4) (2017). Rule 303(c) would require “an intermediary
to provide, on its platform, channels through which investors can communicate with one
another and with representatives of the issuer about offerings made available on the
intermediary’s platform. An intermediary that is a funding portal would be prohibited
from participating in these channels.” Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,445. Rule 303(c)
would also require intermediaries to make these communication channels publicly
available, but only to those who have opened accounts, and require any person posting a
comment to disclose their engagement with an issuer. Id. at 71,445–46.
127 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,461–62.
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E. Small Businesses Should be Wary of Choosing Reg CF
over Reg A+
For an emerging startup or small business, the first
question is howmuch capital does the business need, and secondly,
how to raise such capital. If the startup or small business needs
more than $1.07 million, an issuer should finance through Reg A+.
The disparity in capital raising between both formats is evidently
clear and companies will make this decision quickly. Reg CF is still
finding its footing amongst viable options of capital formation
mechanisms, and it remains to be seen how effective this
regulation will be compared to other methods of financing.
Currently, Reg A+ is also more attractive to investors in
startups because of the $50 million cap and the presumably
large pool of secondary-market investors.128 Under Reg A+
shares sold to the public “are not restricted and not subject to a
holding period before they may be resold.”129 Reg CF holders are
restricted for a period of one year, which may deter potential
investors.130 This difference should be seen as a benefit for
startups looking to finance under Reg CF, however, because any
investor is automatically committed to holding onto their
shares—an important condition for early stage companies.131
Thus, Reg CF is generally more applicable to “early stage
startups looking for seed capital.”132
While many advocates for stringent regulation approve the
final rules, there are also critics who question the viability of Reg
CF given the compliance burdens and significant expenses in
relation to the offering limit.133 Therefore, potential rule changes,
without compromising the disclosure requirements fixed to reduce
the risk of fraud, are necessary tomakeRegCF apracticable option
for crowdfunding.
IV. ADJUSTMENTS TO REG CF IN LIGHT OF REG A+
While Reg A+ fits more mature businesses—those with
an established capital structure—given its “mini IPO”
nickname, Reg CF, in comparison, is more appealing to early
stage companies that need pre-seed or seed investment given





133 See John P. Cleary, Is Crowdfunding Really a Viable Option?, LAW360 (Sept. 1,
2016, 12:45 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/835211/is-crowdfunding-really-a-viable-
option- [https://perma.cc/9QMR-UR3Q].
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the fundraising limits and potentially high costs.134 Yet, given
the necessary “time to market” for securities offerings (albeit
significantly shorter than a Reg A+ offering) the reporting
expenses, intermediary fees, disclosure fees, and
advertisement restrictions, Reg CF may still impose a strain on
a startup’s budget.135 Further, Reg CF has harsher restrictions
on advertising and general solicitation136 than Reg A+, which
allows businesses to “test the waters.”137 In evaluating the
differences between regulations, the Commission should
recognize the burdens Reg CF places on startups. A proposed
solution, and one that has potential given the new political
zeitgeist, is one Congress has implemented: the Fix
Crowdfunding Act.138
Nevertheless, to make Reg CF as popular as Reg A+,
issuers must be able to: (1) raise more than $1 million in a
twelve-month period, (2) increase the amount that each investor
can invest during that twelve-month period, and (3) allow
issuers to “test the waters,” similar to the Reg A+ solicitation
scheme, all while reducing the offering costs. The goal is to solve
some of the problems presented to issuers by Reg CF, while still
keeping investor fraud protection. Raising the maximum
offering amount to $5 million under either a twelve-month
period, or perhaps an eighteen or twenty-four-month period,
might give more startup companies the opportunity to raise
sufficient capital. A change to Rule 100(a) of Reg CF would
increase issuers’ attractiveness to the final rules considering the
costs, and “provide for a meaningful addition to the existing
capital formation options for smaller companies while
maintaining important investor protections.”139
An adjustment to the cap on individual investments by
investors, an increase on the funding cap under Reg CF, the
opportunity for startups to “test the waters,” and a reduction in
issuers’ costs would make Reg CF a more attractive and
practicable method of capital raising for early stage companies.
134 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,488–89 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
135 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,398; Ostashinsky, supra note 62.
136 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (2017).
137 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2017). See Alois, supra note 74. Testing the waters is
permitted before filing and general solicitation is permitted after qualification.
138 The Fix Crowdfunding Act proposed including Special Purpose Vehicles
(SPVs) as authorized investors in crowdfunding offerings, and proposed increasing the
dollar amount thresholds of what a company can raise through crowdfunding,
specifically Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. For a more detailed explanation of the
Congressional bill, see generally Fix Crowdfunding Act, H.R. 4855, 114th Cong (2016);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 114-661 (2016).
139 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,391.
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First, the Commission should adjust the “lesser provision” to a
“greater provision” because the current rules put too significant a
constraint on capital formation.140 “Investment limitationswill likely
have a negative effect on capital formation . . . [and] investment
limitationsmaymake itmore difficult for some issuers to reach their
funding targets.”141 This seems like a major deterring factor for
investors when opting for a crowdfunded investment.142 If the
investor can invest the greater of five percent of their annual income
or net worth as opposed to the lessor of the two, then the investor
will have the ability to diversify within the securities-based
crowdfunding market.143 While the limits expect to reduce the
risk of loss for investors, the Commission notes that there is “no
available market data that would allow us to empirically
evaluate the magnitude of these effects.”144 Therefore, the
Commission should gather information on crowdfunding
transactions or change this rule to optimize capital formation
before limiting such a harsh cap on investments.
Second, perhaps with the support of Congress, the
Commission should increase the $1.07 million cap to at least $5
million per twelve-month period. This is crucial to allowing
companies to truly reap a benefit from the exemption considering
the offering costs and intermediary fees. The Commission could
develop a two-tiered system under Reg CF, with offerings available
at $1.07 million and $5 million. Due to the success of Reg A+,
borrowing the exemption’s two-tiered model may be an ideal
solution because the Commission can keep the current investment
limitations disclosure requirements, and integration rules,145
without eliminating the basic framework of the exemption.
140 Georgia Quinn, Potential Pitfalls of Regulation CF—Part 1: Practical
Concerns for an Issuer, Crowdfund Insider (Jan. 6, 2016, 1:18 PM), https://www.crowd
fundinsider.com/2016/01/79776-potential-pitfalls-of-regulation-crowdfunding-part-i-pra
ctical-concerns-for-issuer [https://perma.cc/8AKF-THZP].
141 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,496.
142 Id.
143 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,495. (“We recognize that these provisions
also will limit the potential upside for investors. This may particularly affect the
decisions of investors with large portfolios who might be able to absorb losses and
understand the risks associated with risky investments . . . . Moreover, limiting the
participation of such investors may negatively affect the informational efficiency of the
securities-based crowdfunding market.”).
144 Id. at 71,496.
145 The Commission has noted that the issuers may conduct other exempt
offerings without integrating those offerings with a Reg CF. This concern, however, is
that issuers will have to take on additional measures to meet the exemption’s solicitation
restrictions. Id. at 71,494. For example,
an issuer conducting a concurrent exempt offering for which general
solicitation is not permitted will need to be satisfied that purchasers in that
offering were not solicited by means of the offering made in reliance on Section
4(a)(6). Alternatively, an issuer conducting a concurrent exempt offering for
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Thirdly, the Commission should allow Reg CF issuers to
“test the waters” and make an offering announcement to
determine their potential success to raise capital going
forward. “Testing the waters” allows issuers the opportunity to
solicit non-binding interest from potential investors prior to the
filing of mandated disclosure documents and the initial
offering, thereby gauging success prior to incurring additional
disclosure costs. Reg CF is currently unattractive because the
rules only permit issuers to compensate offering promoters
through communication channels provided by an intermediary
on the intermediary’s platform.146 Issuers cannot “effectively
use the Internet or social media to promote their equity
crowdfunding raise.”147 For example, if an entrepreneur had a
novel idea for a new startup, they could properly gauge the
investor demand before spending exorbitant filing costs with
the Commission. Moreover, the entrepreneur could realize that
$1.07 million is not enough, and the venture should seek
additional capital.
The drawback to “testing the waters” under a Reg CF
scheme, perhaps, is the imposition of an additional cost on the
issuer. While this opportunity to increase communication with
investors could enhance capital formation efforts by issuers, it
might also result in increased disclosure requirements and
overall cost. Yet, by adjusting the advertising and solicitation
restrictions, the Commission can still protect investors by
directing them to the materials on the intermediary’s platform
which includes disclosures necessary for them to make informed
investment decisions.148 Even if issuers can “test the waters”
through a funding portal, the Commission avoids improper
which general solicitation is permitted, for example, under Rule 506(c), cannot
include in any such general solicitation an advertisement of the terms of an
offering made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6), unless that advertisement
otherwise complies with Section 4(a)(6) and the final rules.
Id.
146 17 C.F.R. § 227.205(a) (2017).
147 Samuel Guzik, JOBS Act Crowdfunding Begins on May 16, 2016: Don’t Get
Busted for Solicitation!, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.crowd
fundinsider.com/2016/03/83470-jobs-act-crowdfunding-begins-on-may-16-2016-dont-get-
busted-for-solicitation [https://perma.cc/H3BX-H2YD].
148 The final rules “prohibit an issuer from advertising the terms of the offering,
except for notices that direct investors to an intermediary’s platform. The terms of the offering
include the amount offered, the nature of the securities, price of the securities and length of
the offering period . . . . The notices are similar to the ‘tombstone ads’ permitted under
Securities Act Rule 134.” Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,505; see also John R. Hempill,
Crowdfunding Moves Forward: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Issues
Proposed Rules on Crowdfunding, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Oct. 31, 2013),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/crowdfunding-moves-forward-securities-and-exch
ange-commission-sec-issues-proposed-ru [https://perma.cc/9UJ3-YJDB].
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promotion and advertising while monitoring the risk of fraud.
By restricting issuers to a single communication channel
provided by one sole intermediary, the Commission can protect
investors and improve the crowdfunding market.
A “testing the waters” provision could fit the Reg CF
scheme by adjusting the communication channels. Allowing
issuers to advertise for no more than a twenty-one-day span
before offering equity through a funding portal can ultimately
help issuers reduce “upfront cost[s] of conducting a Title III
offering and the risk of paying significant compliance/legal fees
for an unsuccessful offering.”149 Alternatively, if an issuer can
publish a startup on multiple Commission-approved funding
portals and other media platforms, accessibility to the general
public would be more realistic and the ability to raise $1–5
million would be more feasible. The Commission could also allow
issuers to advertise their offering on their websites, so long as
the specific terms of the offering are found only through the
intermediary. This way, the Commission can impose less strict
liability on intermediaries while providing issuers with a greater
opportunity to promote their offering.
CONCLUSION
As Reg CF stands right now, the Commission must make
adjustments to the exemption. The investment cap, investor
limitations, and issuer costs demand it. Reg CF is subjected to
criticism and reform, and in a new political climate, changes in
regulation may help improve the plight of young startups and
small businesses. Nevertheless, the Commission should continue
to promote Reg CF because the exemption has created an
opportunity for small market enterprises to raise capital.150 Given
the early success rate for Reg CF offerings, the exemption proves
that there are many issuers seeking to raise capital and many
investors looking to diversify. The attractiveness of Reg CF is
rapidly growing, and therefore the Commission must monitor
how the increase in offerings affects issuers, investors, and
intermediaries alike. The Commission must monitor how the
disclosure requirements and costs affect issuers, and continue to
find ways to improve investor protection. The increase in
149 Anthony Zeoli, The Fix Crowdfunding Act. What it Fixes &What it Does Not,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 28, 2016, 5:45 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/
07/88536-fix-crowdfunding-act-fixes-not [https://perma.cc/TDL5-Z3QW].
150 Sherwood Neiss, Here’s How Regulation Crowdfunding Performed in 2016,
VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 11, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2017/01/11/heres-how-
regulation-crowdfunding-performed-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/8BMX-U9BN].
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offerings indicates that Regulation Crowdfunding is here to stay.
But rest assured, rules are meant to be amended.
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